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[L. A. No. 22050. In Bank. Oct. 21, 1952.] 
ARNOI,D h PETERSON et a1., Respondents, v. RUSSELL 
F. JOHNSON et a1., Appellants. 
[1] Taxation - Equalization of Taxes - Hearing. - Before an ad 
valorelll tax becomes final, the taxpayer must be given an 
opportunity to have the assessOl·'s valuation reviewed by an 







art. XIII, § 9.) 
ld.-Equalization of Taxes-Hearing.-After a tax assessment 
has been equalized or the taxpayer has failed to avail himself 
of the right to an equalization hearing, and the tax levied 
against the property has become final, the taxpayer has DO 
further right to an equalization hearing. 
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-RedemptioD.-If property is 
sold to the state after an equalization hearing for nonpayment 
of tax, it can be redeemed only on the terms prescribed by 
the Legislature, there being no constitutional right of re-
demption. 
ld. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption. - Unless a 
statute otherwise proyidrs, one 'Who claims a partial interest 
in tax-sold property may be required to pay all of the taxes, 
penalties and costs to effect a redemption. 
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-The partial 
redemption statute (Pol. Code, § 3818; now Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 4146,4155) enables a purchaser of part of property sold to 
the state for nonpayment of taxes to redeem that part for less : 
than the amount necessary to redeem the whole, but neither . 
the purchaser nor the owner of the ta~-sold property may 
drmand that the procedure be other than that provided by 
the statute. 
ld. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption. - Under the 
partial red~mption statute the valuation of the tax assessor 
is final; however the purchaser and owner of the tax-sold 
property may contract in advance as to the amount to be paid 
by each and thus avoid any uncertainty as to the valuations the 
assessor may place on the separate parts. 
ld.-Tax Deeds.-Since the proration of taxes between the 
property redeemed and the part not redeemed is inherent in 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 218 et seq. 
[3] See CaI.Jur., Taxation, § 309; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 1097. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Taxation, § 200; [3] Taxation, 
§ 329; [4-6,8] Taxation, § 337; [7] Taxation, § 349; [9] Taxation, 
§ 347; [10] Military, § 2a. 
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the whole partial redemption procedure, the area subsequently 
deeded to the state and the amount for which it is sold will 
necessarily be less than that set forth in the delinquent list, . 
and hence the tax deed is not invalid because it does not 
correspond to the description and the amount of taxes set 
forth in such list. 
[8] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-Since property 
that has been sold to the state by operation of law is assessed 
as if no sale had taken place (Pol. Code, § 3813), taxes there-
after levied must be paid to effect a redemption, and they are 
also part of the taxes to be apportioned at the time of partial 
redemption. . 
[9] Id.-Tax Deeds-Curative Acts.-Such irregularities in tax 
proceedings as omission of the dollar sign from the 1931 pub- ! 
lished delinquent list and stamping the original assessment 
roll "redeemed" rather than "part-redeemed" have been vali-
dated by the Curative Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 1993). . 
[10] Military-Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.-Provisions 
of Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (54 Stats. 1178, 
ch. 888) may not be invoked to render invalid a tax sale by 
the state where neither the complaining party nor his de-
pendents occupied the property for dwelling, agricultural or 
business purposes at the time of his military service. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. A. A. Scott, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
John F. Poole and Alvan M. Palmer for Appellants. 
Holbrook & Tarr and W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., for Re-
spondents. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Louis A. 
Babior, and Spencer L. Halverson, Deputy City Attorneya, 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment 
quieting plaintiffs' title to 80 acres of land in Los Angeles 
County. 
Tbp. land was assessed to Russell F. Johnson in 1931 as an 
undivided part of 120 acres owned by him. In July of that 
year, he conveyed the entire parcel to his wife, Myrtle N. 
Johnson, who failed to pay the taxes as they became due: ?e 
delinquent tax list for the year 1931 was published, g'lViJll 
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notice that the 120-acre parcel assessed to Russell F. Johnson 
would be sold to the state by operation of law unless $380.06 
of taxes, penalties, and costs were paid. Neither Mr. nor 
Mrs. Johnson paid this amount or any part thereof. 
In 1934, Mrs. Johnson conveyed 40 of the 120 acres to 
Josephine Palomara, who in turn conveyed them to plaintiff 
Peterson. Peterson redeemed the 40 acres under the partial 
redemption statute (Pol. Code, § 3818, now Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 4146-4155). When Peterson applied for redemption of the 
40 acres, the assessor placed a separate valuation on the part 
sought to be redeemed for each tax delinquent year. The 
remaining acres were valued at the difference between the 
original valuation and the valuation placed on the 40 acres. 
The taxes were prorated so that each part of the land was 
charged with the same amount of taxes that each would have 
borne had the assessor made a separate assessment originally. 
In ] 937, the state took title to the remaining 80 acres under 
a tax deed. The deed described only the 80 unredeemed 
acres, and recited that they had been sold to the state in 
1932 for $258.06. This figure was the unpaid balance of the 
1931 taxes, penalties, and costs that had been prorated to the 
80 acres. In May, 1939, Mrs. Johnson died intestate, leaving 
her husband and two sons as heirs. Defendant, Warren R. 
Johnson, one of thft sons, was in military service from 1942 
to 1945. In 1946, the sons assigned their interests in their 
mother's estate to their father. In 1945, Peterson and Smith 
bought the 80 acres from the state, and in 1947 brought this 
action to quiet their title thereto. 
The provisions of the partial red emptio. statute (Pol. Code, 
§ 3818; now Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4154) require the assessor 
to place a valuation on the parcel to be redeemed for the 
purpose of prorating the taxes. Defendants contend that the 
statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for an 
equalization hearing of the split valuation, and that the court 
therefore erred in rejecting defendants' offer to prove that 
the valuation placed on the 40 acres was much less than its 
true value and that an excessive valuation was therefore 
placed on the remaining 80 acres and in sustaining objections 
to the introduction of ev1<'If'Dre as to the value of the property 
r('deemed. 
This rontention confuses the rights of an owner before 
a tax upon his propcrt~' becomes final and his rights after 
the property has bcen sold to the state for nonpayment of the 
tax. [1) Before an ad valorem tax becomes final, the tax-
) 
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payer must be given an opportunity to have the assessor's 
valuation reviewed by an impartial board of equalization or 
other tribunal. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 9; Bandini Estate 
Co. v. Los A.ngeles County, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 230 [82 P.2d 
185], and cases cited therein.) [2] After the assessment 
has been equalized, or the taxpayer has failed to avail him-
self of the right to an equalization hearing, and the tax levied 
against the property has become final, the taxpayer has no . 
further right to an equalization hearing. [3] If the prop-
erty is thereafter sold to the state for nonpayment of the tax, 
it can be redeemed only upon the terms prescribed by the 
Legislature. "There is no constitutional right to redeem 
property that has been sold to the state for the nonpayment 
of taxes. «The right of redemption comes entirely from the 
statute, and is subject' to all the limitations and conditions 
therein imposed.' (Quinn v. Kenney, 47 Cal. 147, 150.)" 
(SllJter-Yuba. Inti. CO. V. Waste, 21 Cal.2d 781, 785 [136 P.2d 
11].) [4] Thus, one who claims a partial interest in tax-
sold property may be required to pay all of the taxes, 
penalties, and costs to effect a redemption. (Mayo V. MM-
shan, 23 Cal. 594, 595.) It is only since 1917 that a purchaser 
of part of the property sold to the state for nonpayment of I 
taxes could redeem that part for less than the amount neces-
sary to redeem the whole. 
[5] The partial redemption provisions enable an owner 
of tax-sold property to take advantage of a market for part 
of the property where none exists for the whole. The pur-
chaser not only gives him the purchase price, but reduces the 
amount necessary to be paid by the vendor should he wish 
to redeem. Moreov'er, it is the owner of the tax-sold property 
who creates the situation in which two persons rather than 
. one become interested in redemption. The Legislature has 
seen fit to accommodate the parties by a division of the right 
to redeem, hut neither party may demand that the procedure 
be ot.her than that provided. [6] Under the statute, the valua-
tion of the assessor is final. The parties may, of course, eon-
tract in advance as to th~ amount to be paid by each and 
thus avoid any uncertainty as to the valuations the assessor 
may place upon the separate parts. 
It is true that at one t.ime (1917-1927), the Legislature 
provided for valuation by the anditor and prescribed a pro-
C'cdurl' for filin~ and h!'aring prot!'sts regarding the proposed 
diyisiflll. As amended in 1927, the statut.e requires the auditor 
to secn!'!' the valuation from the assessor and omits the pro-
) 
) 
Oct. 1952] PETERSON lI. JOHNSON 
[39 C.2d '145; 249 P.2d 171 
749 
test procedure. 'l'he Legislature apparently concluded that 
the assessor, who made the original valuation, could arrive 
at thJ! correct division thereof without the necessity of fur-
ther proceedings that would delay partial redemption. 
[7] Defendants also contend that the tax proceedings 
were void, on the ground that the description and the amount 
of taxes set forth in the 1931 delinquent tax list do not cor-
respond to those in the 1937 tax deed to the state. Defendants 
do 110t deny that the tax list correctly sets forth the amount 
of taxes, penalties, and costs owed the state or that the state 
had· the power to declare the entire 120 acres sold for that 
amount. The proration of taxes between the property re-
deemed and the part not redeemed is inherent in the whole 
partial redemption procedure. At the time of the tax deed to 
the state in 1937, the 40 acres had been redeemed by Peterson. 
Since taxes remained unpaid only on the 80 acres, only 80 
acres could be deeded to the state. Thus, after a partial re-
demption, the area subsequently deeded to the state and the 
amount for which it is sold will necessarily be less than that 
set forth in the delinquent list. 
Defendants contend that the proceedings after partial 
redemption were void on the ground that the assessor placed ! 
separate valuations on the 40 acres for each tax-delinquent 
year. Section 3818 of the Political Code at the time of the 
partial redemption provided that the auditor was to submit 
a description of the property sought to be redeemed to the 
assessor, "who must place a valuation thereon." The auditor 
was then to estimate the amount of taxes due thereon. De-
fendants interpret this language as authorizing the assessor 
to place only one valuation on the part to be redeemed and not 
a separate valuation for each year. 
[8] Property that has been sold to the state by operation 
of law is assessed as if no sale had taken place. (Pol. Code, 
§ 3813.) Taxes thereafter levied must be paid in order to 
effect a redemption. (Pol. Code, § 3817.) They are also part 
of the taxes to be apportioned at the time of partial redemp-
tion. Since property values may fluctuate from year to 
year, the valuation upon which the apportionment is based 
must reflect such changes. To accomplish the purpose of the 
foregoing statutes, it was therefore necessary for the assessor 
to place a separate valuation 011 the property for each year. 
Section 4154 of the Revenue and Taxation Code makes this 
clear by providing: I' The assessor shall immediately place a 
separate valuation on the parcel for each year in which it was 
, 
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delinquent and not separately valued .... " (See Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 2~) 
[9] Defendants also contend that the tax proceedings 
were invalid, on the grounds that the dollar sign was omitted I 
from the 1931 published delinquent list and that the original I 
assessment roll had been stamped "redeemed" rather than 
"part-redeemed." These irregularities have long since been 
validated by the curative act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 1993). i 
(Wall v. M. «7 R. Sheep Co., 33 Ca1.2d 768 [205 P.2d 14].) I 
[10] Defendants contend finally that the provisions of the 
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act render the sale by the . 
state of the 80 acres invalid. Warren R. Johnson was in the 
military service at the time of this sale in February, 1945. 
That act is applicable only to real property owned and oc-
cupied for dwelling, agricultural, or business purposes by a , 
person in military service. (McCaslin v. Hamblen, 37 Cal.2d ! 
196, 202 [231 P.2d 1].) Warren R. Johnson testified that' 
neither he nor his dependents occupied the property for any • 
of the specified purposes at the time of his military service. 
Thus, by virtue of its express provisions, the act is inappli. 
cable here. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
